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Reinvention
Labs
Reinvention Laboratories were created
in the United States as part of the National Performance Review
and represented a novel approach to strategic change in the
federal government. In assigning an important role to middle
management in the design and implementation of new work technologies,
the lab program contrasted with more conventional approaches
to top-down
change in which management was dominant.
This study examines the viability of
the generative model that the lab program represents as a
means of inducing agencies to employ post bureaucratic organizing
principles. A conclusion is that although a variety of factors
will affect the degree of success achieved, the model holds
promise as a means of achieving strategic change in public
organizations with a bottom-up
approach to change
A distinguishing feature of the National
Performance Review (NPR) is the degree of attention directed
to what Arnold (1998) calls the "micro-context of reform,"
referring to changes to work processes and relationships within
agencies. Consistent with a central theme of modern management
theory, the sponsors of NPR endorse a shift away from organizing
practices associated with the bureaucratic-scientific management
model whereby workers are assigned highly specialized tasks,
extensive written rules govern work behaviors, and hierarchical
reporting and communication prevail. The new post bureaucratic
(Barzelay, 1992) model presumes greater autonomy for frontline
workers and is accompanied by a structure that facilitates
the use of that autonomy to encourage high quality service,
self- management, and innovation.
Extensive theoretical justification
has been provided as to the suitability of this new model
for modern conditions. A central problem for organizations
seeking to adopt this model, however, is that of transitioning
from the new to the old, of getting "from here to there"
(Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992). The issue is presented
in the management literature as one of strategic change (Tichy,
1983). Insights into the problem of strategic change can be
gained from a variety of theoretical perspectives. A key issue
relates to the relative roles of top and lower level management
in the design and implementation of alternative structures
and work processes. Within the innovation literature, for
example, Marcus (1988) contrasts rule-bound and autonomous
approaches to innovation implementation. The rule-bound approach
presumes a "central authority who wants to see subordinates
follow rules to carry out his or her policies," whereas
the autonomous approach "accepts that people in the lowest
echelons of an organization exhibit autonomy by redefining
policies during the course of implementation" (p. 237).
Marcus concludes that "implementation is likely to be
more effective when policy implementors [i.e., lower level
managers] are free to design and determine the specifics"
(p. 251).
Within the organizational change literature,
Kanter et al. ( 1992) note the scarcity of "practical
examples of organizations . . . that have fully transformed
themselves to attain this ideal [i.e., the post bureaucratic
model]" (p. 5) and observe that "grassroots innovation-often
referred to as bottom-up change-is often preferred to large-scale
top- down change as a source of enduring results" (p.
7). Similarly, Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector (1990) note the
widespread failure of top-down programmatic approaches to
change such as quality circles or attempts to change organizational
culture. They endorse a model in which lower level managers
take the lead in devising alternative means of processing
work.
The reinvention lab program, which
is an NPR initiative launched by Vice President Al Gore and
his staff as a means of embedding post bureaucratic organizing
practices within the federal executive establishment, presents
an opportunity to examine the viability of change strategies
in which lower level managers are allowed a central role.
In the discussion below, this generic approach is identified
as generative, in contrast with a command or top-down approach
to change. This research is exploratory in nature; no attempt
is made to test the relative efficacy of the two approaches.
Nevertheless, because the generative model represents a departure
from conventional approaches to change, a review of its viability
is important. A second purpose is to examine factors that
account for the relative effectiveness of the generative model
in different organizational contexts.
Strategy-Making
Process Models
Hart (1992) identifies 11 separate typologies of strategy-making
processes, which he organizes into a master typology or integrative
framework. Strategy, in this context, is a rather amorphous
concept. Shrivastava and Grant ( 1985), referencing Chandler
(1962), define strategic decisions as "ones that involve
a commitment of a large amount of organizational resources
for the fulfillment of organizational goals and purposes through
appropriate means" (p. 98). For the purpose of this discussion,
the change from bureaucratic to post bureaucratic structures
represents a specific strategy suited for analysis within
Hart's (1992) framework.
The modal approach to strategy making
is what Hart (1992) calls the command mode, which presumes
a highly centralized structure in which lower level participants
abide by directives from the top. In this mode:-
Strategy formulation is exclusively
the function of top management,
Top management relies primarily on formal means (rules, hierarchical
direction, staffing) of inducing compliance by other organizational
participants
Implementation is separate from and subsequent to formulation.
Each of these three features represents
a dimension of the strategy-making process according to which
other models can be categorized. Hence, one dimension is the
degree of domination by top management of the formulation
process (top-levels dominant vs. shared), a second is whether
primary reliance is placed on formal or informal levers or
means of inducing behavioral change, and a third is whether
formulation and implementation occur iteratively or sequentially.
Multiple strategy-making models (or
modes) identified by Hart (1992), Mintzberg and Waters (1985),
and Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) arrayed according to these
three dimensions. Both Mintzberg and Waters and Bourgeois
and Brodwin include in their typologies models that share
the three essential features of Hart's command mode. All three
sets of authors also include an approach or approaches that
represent the polar opposite of the command mode. Although
different terms are employed, for the purpose of this discussion
this generic approach will be labeled generative, consistent
with Hart's terminology. In the generative model, responsibility
for strategy formulation is shared by managers at all levels,
informal rather than formal means serve to gain compliance,
and formulation and implementation occur in an iterative rather
than sequential manners
Hart (1992) describes the generative
mode as one in which "strategy is made via intrapreneurship-new
product ideas emerge upward, and employee initiative shapes
the firm's strategic direction" (p. 338). Similarly,
in the "crescive" model identified by Bourgeois
and Brodwin (1984), strategy comes upward from the firing
line, rather than downward from the top. The role of the CEO
has moved from designer to that of premise-setter and judge....
Here, the strategic problem revolves around the CEO's ability
to define organization purposes (i.e. set decision premises)
broadly enough to encourage innovation, and to select judiciously
from among those projects or strategy alternatives that reach
his attention. (p. 254)
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) describe
the "umbrella strategy" as one in which "leaders
who have only partial control over other actors in an organization
. . . set general guidelines for behavior-define the boundaries-
and then let other actors manoeuvre within them"; the
general guidelines may be established by means of a "vision
emanating from the central leadership" (p. 263).
These theorists offer ideas on the
circumstances for which these approaches to strategic change
are most suitable. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) posit that
their umbrella strategy is suited to circumstances in which
the leader has "only partial control over other actors"
and an environment that is "complex, and perhaps somewhat
uncontrollable and unpredictable as well" (p. 263). The
planned strategy (analogous to the command mode), in contrast,
is suitable to environments that are, "if not benign
or controllable, then at least rather predictable" (p.
259), because separation between the formulation and implementation
phases requires that the formulator be able to anticipate
circumstances that will prevail at the time of implementation.
Where formulation and implementation occur in an iterative
manner, as in the umbrella mode, there is an opportunity to
adjust to changing circumstances-an approach that is conducive
to strategic learning.
Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) regard
their crescive model as particularly suitable for "the
large divisionalized firm" (p. 259). They question the
validity of many of the assumptions that underlie the command
mode, observing that, in such firms, "the chief executive
cannot monitor all significant opportunities and threats"
and that "information collected at lower levels often
becomes stale before it can be assimilated" (p. 257).
Both considerations mitigate in favor of a shared approach
to strategy formulation in which information accessible to
those at lower levels can be applied to the solution of strategic
problems. They further observe that strategies formulated
in a participative manner are more likely to be successfully
implemented.
Applying the Generative
Model
Is such an approach to strategic change suitable to the public
sector generally and to the federal government in particular?
It is possible to identify features of the federal environment
that appear well suited to the generative approach. The federal
executive establishment broadly resembles the divisionalized
firm with substantial authority residing at the department
and bureau levels. The environment confronting federal managers,
although less dynamic than that confronting most private-sector
firms, is nevertheless increasingly turbulent and- with multiple
stakeholders, fragmented sources of external authority, and
a proliferation of administrative controls- highly complex
(Rainey, 1991).
The reinvention lab program qualifies
as an example of the generative approach to strategy making
and strategic change. The intent of the program's designers
was that managers of units designated as labs would be allowed
sufficient autonomy to identify and test new approaches to
processing work and that those deemed successful would be
institutionalized across other units. Elements of the program
that are similar to those of the generative model include
the following:
Lab managers and their staffs would
be allowed and in fact encouraged to participate in the formulation
of specific strategies for their unit and/or organization
that fit the broad guidelines set forth by the vice president
and his staff in the report of the NPR (U.S. NPR, 1993).
Vice President Gore and his staff relied more on informal
than on formal means of inducing compliance with their vision.
For example, the reinvention lab designation carries with
it no formal authorities; rather, it serves to convey to other
stakeholders the legitimacy the change efforts so designated.
In most cases, the units designated laboratories were sufficiently
small to allow an iterative process of formulation and implementation
such that the design could be continually adjusted and refined.
Consistent with the lab rubric, the spirit was intended to
be one of experimentation and learning.
The lab program offers an opportunity
to examine the suitability of the generic model to this particular
environment. In the following section, data collected on the
lab program serves as a basis for analyzing the efficacy of
the generative model as a means of inducing strategic change
in the federal government.
The Reinvention
Lab Experience
The reinvention lab program was formally inaugurated in the
spring of 1993 when Vice President Gore sent a letter to the
heads of all departments and of the larger independent agencies
asking each to designate two or three programs or units as
"laboratories for reinventing government" (Gore,
1993). As with other elements of NPR, implementation was left
largely up to the departments (or agencies). According to
U.S. NPR (1998), reinvention labs are
designated to lead the way and set the pace of change. They
are asked to experiment with new processes and new ways of
doing business. They are called upon to be creative and innovative,
and radically improve service and performance.
In 1994, when the research for this
article began, there were approximately 140 reinvention labs
distributed among 28 departments and agencies. Thirty-five
randomly selected labs provide the primary data set for this
study; 176 interviews have been conducted with 102 different
individuals at the 35 labs. The interviews occurred in three
phases: The first phase was from late 1994 to mid1995, the
second phase was from mid-1995 to early-1996, and the third
phase occurred in early 1998. The initial contact was with
the person identified as lab manager by NPR.
Subsequent interviews were conducted
with other individuals who had knowledge of the project and
its history and with those, generally from the same agency,
who could offer a perspective different from the direct participants.
A semi structured interview protocol was employed; archival
materials were also used as source of data.
The primary unit of analysis in this
study is the reinvention lab program as a whole, consistent
with a focus on the applicability of the change model the
lab program represents to the federal government. Embedded
units of analysis (Yin, 1994) include the individual labs
and specific changes or proposed changes labeled innovations.
One reinvention lab might have multiple innovations. For example,
the debt collection service in the Department of Education
has three separate innovations: the reorganization of workers
into teams, the institution of a power-sharing arrangement
with the employee union, and an attempt by the unit to gain
a degree of autonomy from departmental budget processes. As
listed in Table 2, there were 48 separate innovations at the
35 laboratories.
Innovation Processes
The reinvention lab program is analyzed within a framework
devised by innovation theorists. The three-phase model of
innovation employed represents a hybrid of those proposed
by Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek (1973) and Wilson (1973). The
phases identified are
Initiation/design
Implementation
Institutionalization.
Initiation/design represents that phase
when the innovation is first conceptualized and its component
elements identified; implementation occurs when the innovation
is put in place at the local (unit) level. Implementation
implicitly incorporates a design element as testing occurs
and adjustments to the original concept are made.' Finally,
institutionalization occurs when the innovation is replicated
by other units within the organization.
The intent of the lab program is to
induce organizational innovation, defined as "the successful
utilization of processes, programs, or products which are
new to an organization and which are introduced as a result
of decisions made within that organization" (Rowe &
Boise, 1973, p. 6). The emphasis in the lab program is less
on new products or programs than on changes to work processes
consistent with the goals identified above.
The reinvention lab program is premised
on certain assumptions regarding the behaviors of midlevel
federal managers; these assumptions correspond to the different
phases of the innovation process and are congruent with the
tenets of the generative approach to change cited above, as
follows:
Initiation/design: The program presumes
that midlevel and lower level managers will participate in
strategy formulation by putting forth ideas for improving
the performance of their organization consistent with reinvention
precepts.
Implementation: The lab designation is intended to legitimize
innovative activity by lower level managers and to facilitate
implementation by deterring interference from other units.
Implicit in the lab designation is that these units will be
granted some degree of autonomy to test innovative approaches
to service delivery.
Institutionalization: Although this approach to change can
have a systemic impact only if individual innovations are
successfully replicated, the program sponsors did not specify
how this would be accomplished.
The following discussion evaluates
the extent to which the assumptions listed under initiation/design
and implementation have been borne out and the extent to which
institutionalization has occurred despite the lack of an identifiable
strategy toward that end. This permits a preliminary examination
of the suitability of the generative model to the federal
environment. Thus, the model can be regarded as viable to
the extent that lower level managers have responded by proposing
changes, lab status facilitated implementation, and successful
innovations were institutionalized. Table 2 lists the 35 labs
included in this study and the innovations associated with
each as well as summary information for each phase of the
innovation process. Brief case histories of several of the
labs are presented below. The cases were selected specifically
because they illustrate how the model was intended to work;
they constitute best practices and are not representative
of the broader sample in this respect.
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